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Uncertainty is a key dimension of individual decisionmaking. In-
dividuals cannot insure against certain contingencies under incom-
plete markets. Uncertainty thus influences the life-cycle evolution of
consumption and savings, labor supply and asset allocation, and edu-
cation and occupation choices. Uncertainty and risk also determine
income and consumption inequality. Individuals who are identical ex
ante will have different lifetime paths of consumption ex post, as some
individuals are lucky and get good draws of income, employment, and
health, whereas others get bad shocks and end up with lower levels
of consumption over the life cycle. Income mobility and the persis-
tence of income inequality and poverty depend on the dynamics of
earnings, health outcomes, investment opportunities, and general
earnings capacity.
In this paper, we measure the earnings uncertainty faced by indi-
viduals. Most of the existing empirical literature focuses on the dy-
namics of income and wages using data from developed countries
(Abowd and Card, 1989; Pischke, 1995; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).
Our data are drawn from a survey of Chilean households—namely,
the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos (ESI) carried out by the Na-
tional Institute of Statistics (INE) (see INE, various years). Whether
consumers in an emerging economy face levels of uncertainty simi-
lar to those in developed economies is an empirical matter that is
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addressed in this paper. The welfare consequences of uncertainty may
be much larger than our findings indicate, however: individuals oper-
ating in underdeveloped markets have fewer opportunities than their
counterparts in developed countries to share risks through the mar-
ketplace, and the public welfare system is much smaller in develop-
ing countries, offering little possibility of offsetting negative shocks.
Our modeling structure allows us to distinguish between a predict-
able and an unpredictable component of income. We further decom-
pose the unpredictable part into permanent and transitory shocks to
income. Specifically, we model the unexplained portion of individual
earnings as the sum of a permanent and a (persistent) transitory dis-
turbance. We also allow for time-varying variances of permanent and
transitory disturbances, and we evaluate whether they correlate with
the business cycle. Since the ESI data set is a repeated cross-section,
we construct synthetic panels to perform our estimations. Our syn-
thetic panels contain annual observations from 1990–2000, based on
five-year birth cohorts.
Our results for men between the ages of twenty-five and sixty
indicate that the age profile of labor income has the typical hump
shape and that there are very large educational effects. At age fifty, a
college-educated individual expects to earn 2.5 times the earnings of
a person who finished high school and 3.8 times the earnings of an
individual who only completed eight years of schooling. We also find
that married men earn more than their single and divorced counter-
parts and that household size has a negative impact on earnings.
Our decomposition of the unexplained portion of income yields a
high persistence but low variance of permanent shocks, together with
a negligible variance of the transitory shock. These low variances
may be an artifact of our synthetic panel technique, since averaging
reduces the observed variability. We investigate this hypothesis by
comparing our results to those obtained using U.S. data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (see SRC, various years).
When we replicate our cohort estimation procedure with U.S. data,
we find a similar process for the dynamics of income, but the vari-
ance of earnings is significantly higher in the United States than in
Chile. We interpret this as evidence of the relative rigidity of the
Chilean labor market vis-à-vis the U.S. labor market. Another result
is that averaging within cohorts reduces the estimated variance of
the permanent shock by one order of magnitude. We cannot provide
an estimate of the variance of the transitory shock, as all our bench-
mark estimates turn out to be insignificant.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 385
If markets are complete, individuals can perfectly share their good
and bad fortunes. The measurement of individual uncertainty then
becomes irrelevant. However, vast evidence shows that in practice,
many important events are not insured and markets do not fully pool
risks (Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Dynarski and Gruber, 1996). A num-
ber of mechanisms help individuals insulate their consumption from
income shocks (changes in their labor supply, spousal income, public
and private transfers, and the progressivity of the income tax). In this
paper we ask whether government transfers allow consumers to partly
offset persistent shifts in earnings capacity. To answer this question,
we reestimate our basic model using labor income plus the receipts
from public welfare programs as our measure of individual earnings.
We find that the inclusion of government transfers hardly affects the
estimated income process, although earned income has a negative ef-
fect on the likelihood that any given individual receives a transfer.
The paper also provides a number of applications. We analyze in-
come inequality and earnings mobility simulating the life-cycle income
profiles of  individuals who face the process we have estimated. Since
income is estimated to be highly persistent, we should expect to ob-
serve little mobility of individuals across the distribution of income. An
individual who starts off at the lowest quintile of the earnings distribu-
tion will stay in that same quintile for a year with a 0.77–0.84 chance.
Furthermore, the likelihood that the same individual will still be in
the lowest quintile ten years ahead ranges between 0.40 and 0.58. A
similar pattern is found at the top of the distribution. That is, we find
that the Chilean income distribution is highly persistent because the
underlying earnings process is also highly persistent. Finally, we find
that a large portion of income inequality can be explained by the un-
derlying variability of the earnings process.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
data and compares the ESI to the Encuesta de Caracterización
Socioeconómica Nacional (or CASEN survey), which is the most widely
used survey for the analysis of Chilean household behavior (see
MIDEPLAN, various years). Section 2 then presents the model and
estimation techniques. In section 3, we provide our estimates of mean
income and then use the unexplained portion of income to fit differ-
ent dynamic processes. We also compare the results on Chile to a
similar sample of U.S. workers. Section 4 provides a number of appli-
cations of our results, and section 5 concludes.386 Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea Repetto
1. DATA
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Encuesta
Suplementaria de Ingresos (ESI), which is a supplement to the na-
tional employment survey conducted monthly by the INE. The main
goal of the ESI is to provide information on individual and household
income. The ESI collects information over the last quarter of every
year on a sample of roughly 36,000 households. These households
are representative of the Chilean population. The survey gathers in-
formation on all household members that are at least fifteen years
old. Data are registered on all types of income perceived during the
previous month, as well as on a number of individual characteristics
such as educational attainment, marital status, gender, and employ-
ment status. Population weights are also provided. Data are avail-
able for the 1990–2000 period, with the exception of 1994 when the
survey was not conducted. The use of the ESI as a source of income
data has been fairly limited; one exception is Granados (2001).
Our analysis considers men between the ages of twenty-five and
sixty who are not self-employed. We deflate all nominal variables us-
ing the consumer price index (CPI) of the corresponding month of the
interview. Real variables are reported in December 1999 Chilean pe-
sos. Table 1 reports the sample’s basic statistics. On average, individu-
als in our sample earn almost 170,000 pesos each month. The median
is just above 100,000 pesos, reflecting the skewness of the Chilean
income distribution. About 17 percent of individuals report income below
the monthly minimum wage. The typical individual in the sample is
thirty-eight years old, married, and has completed nine years of educa-
tion (corresponding to an education level of one year of high school).
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Source: ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
a. In December 1999 Chilean pesos.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 387
Finally, the median household has four residents, and most individuals
live in the V, VIII, and Metropolitan administrative regions.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of personal labor income. The distri-
bution shows the extent of income inequality in Chile, which is ana-
lyzed extensively elsewhere. The figure also shows the distribution of
income in the 1996 CASEN (taken from Baytelman, Cowan, and De
Gregorio, 1999).1 These two distributions are not directly comparable,
as the CASEN figures include transfers and represent different sample
years.2 Furthermore, the ESI distribution is built from our data set on
men. Even so, the graph shows that the distributions are quite alike,
especially for the middle deciles. Most of the differences are concen-
trated at the bottom and top of the distribution: the ratio of the income
share of the 20 percent of individuals with the highest income to the
share of the bottom 20 percent is 7.9 in the ESI versus 13.8 in the
CASEN, while the ratio of the share of the highest decile to the share
of the lowest decile is 13.2 in the ESI and 29.5 in the CASEN.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the mean of the log of real earn-
ings over the sample period. On average, real earnings grew at an
annual rate of 4.7 percent in the period 1990–2000.3 The figure breaks
the sample down by educational attainment: individuals identified as
having a primary education have completed eight years of schooling;
those with a high school education have completed twelve years of
schooling; and those with a college education have completed seven-
teen years of education.4 In all cases the path of mean earnings is
1. The CASEN is the most widely used survey for the analysis of Chilean
household and individual income and earnings. The survey began in 1985, and it
has been carried out almost every two years since then. The CASEN measures
household and individual income for a representative sample of the Chilean popu-
lation; it sampled 48,107 households in 1998. Like the ESI, the survey gathers
information on all types of income and on a number of demographic characteris-
tics. It also collects information on in-kind transfers, such as public programs in
education, housing, and health, and on housing and durable goods ownership.
This type of information supports detailed studies of poverty, and the survey has
mainly been used to examine income inequality and the role of social policies in
reducing it (Anríquez, Cowan, and De Gregorio, 1998; Larrañaga, 1994; Contreras
and others, 2001). We are precluded from the use of the CASEN because of its
two-year frequency. As we show below, the dynamics of earnings is highly persis-
tent, and thus the CASEN misses most of the action in the two-year lag. The
appendix provides a formal demonstration of this point.
2. Nevertheless, the distribution of income has hardly changed over the last
decade. See Baytelman, Cowan, and De Gregorio (1999).
3. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grew at about 5 percent over this
period.
4. Universities in Chile simultaneously grant a college degree and a profes-
sional title. Most programs last about five years.388 Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea Repetto
upwardly trended, although the annual growth rates correlate posi-
tively with educational attainment. Chile, like other countries, has
thus experienced a widening of the earnings distribution.5
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the variance of log earnings over
the sample period, for all individuals and for three different educa-
tion groups. Highly educated workers face a much larger variance of
earnings; that is, there are large private returns on university edu-
cation at the cost of increased earnings risk. The variance of the
earnings of low education groups is quite stable over the period. This
stability contrasts with the behavior of the earnings variance of those
Figure 2. Mean of Log Real Earnings
Figure 1. Distribution of Labor Income: ESI versus CASEN
5. For U.S. evidence, see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992),
and Murphy and Welch (1992); for Chilean evidence, see Bravo and Marinovic
(1997), and Beyer and Le Foulon (2002).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI and CASEN survey data (INE, 1990–2000; Baytelman, Cowan, and
De Gregorio, 1999).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 389
Figure 3. Variance of Log Real Earnings
6. Recent literature modeling earnings processes allows for heterogeneity
between agents. See Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrnæs (2002).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
who have attained college education, which experienced large swings
over the ten-year span.
In the next subsections we use the ESI dataset to estimate mean
income profiles over the life cycle for the typical Chilean individual.
We then use the unexplained portion of income to estimate the dy-
namic process of earnings. The use of the ESI survey has a major
shortcoming: the analysis of income dynamics requires following the
same individuals over time. Since the ESI survey represents cross-
sections of households, we build synthetic panels based on five-year
birth cohorts. Table 2 presents the number of observations available
for each cohort and year.
2. THE EARNINGS MODEL
In this paper, we consider models in which all individuals within
an educational category have identical income processes, but face
different realizations of this process.6 Income consists of the sum of a
predictable component and a stochastic component. Let yit represent
the logarithm of the real measured income of individual i in year t.
Let Zit represent a vector of demographic characteristics, and ηit the
stochastic component of income. We assume that the unexplained
component can be decomposed into a permanent shock, yit
p (such as
health shocks that affect earnings capacity in a long-lasting way andYear
































Source: ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
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long-term unemployment), and a transitory innovation, µ
it (such as
bonuses and overtime pay). We also allow for classical measurement
error,      . Finally, we assume that yp and µ
it are uncorrelated at all
leads and lags. We thus propose the following model for individual
income:
We allow for different assumptions on the process that both the
permanent and transitory innovation follow. In the benchmark case,
for instance, we assume that the permanent component is a random
walk, whereas the transitory shock has some persistence:
We allow for persistence in transitory shocks to account for inno-
vations, such as overtime pay and bonuses, that may last for a while
but do not have long-lasting effects.
Alternatively, we explore a model in which permanent shocks
follow a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process whereas the tran-
sitory component is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.);
that is,
                 , for 0 < η < 1, and
We estimate our complete model in two stages. In the first stage,
we use individual-level data to estimate η and to compute
for each observation in our sample. In the second stage, we classify
all observations on the basis of the year of birth and take averages of
to build a synthetic panel of cohort/year means.7 That is,
7. We use the survey’s population weights to build the means.
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where the superscript c indexes birth-year cohorts and nt
c represents
the number of available observations in cohort c in year t. We use
this synthetic panel to estimate the variances of the permanent and
transitory components of income shocks (σ υt and σ εt , respectively)
and the persistence of the transitory innovation, θ. Our modeling
structure allows for time-varying variances. We estimate these pa-
rameters using equally weighted generalized method of moments
(GMM) by minimizing the distance between the theoretical and the
empirical autocovariances of the first difference of the stochastic com-
ponent of income.8
Assume that there is no measurement error and that the dynam-
ics of earnings are characterized by a random walk plus a first-order
moving average, or MA(1), transitory shock.9 Then,
The theoretical autocovariances are thus given by
                        , for j > 2, and









8. See Altonji and Segal (1996) for an analysis of alternative weighting
procedures.
9. In our procedure, we assume that measurement error cancels out when
we collapse our individual data set into cohort means. We thus ignore measure-
ment error in what follows.
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We follow a similar procedure to estimate the underlying param-
eters when we assume alternative dynamic specifications.
The fact that we construct a synthetic panel and follow cohorts,
but not individuals over time, implies that our analysis is based on
averages. We thus expect to underestimate the true uncertainty level
that individuals face in Chile. In the analysis below, we provide esti-
mates from a comparable sample taken from U.S. data to show how
much the estimated process changes when we follow cohorts instead
of individuals.
3. RESULTS
We report our first-stage estimation results in table 3. In the
regression, we control for age, education, marital status, and house-
hold size, as well as for interaction terms and nonlinear effects of
these variables. We also control for the region of residence and the
year and month of the interview.
Our results show that the age profile of labor income has the
typical hump shape found for other countries. We also find very large
educational effects. Figure 4 plots the estimated age profiles for three
different educational groups identified above. All the other variables
have been set at their average sample levels. The magnitude of the
educational effect becomes evident when we consider three individu-
als who are identical except for their level of schooling. At age twenty-
five, an individual who has completed eight years of schooling earns,












Table 3. Mean Incomea
(Dependent variable: log of monthly labor income)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
a. The dependent variable is the log of monthly labor income. The regressions include a full set of dummies for
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on average, about 85,000 pesos per month, whereas an individual with
twelve years of education earns almost 120,000 pesos per month—that
is, a difference of 40 percent. A college-educated individual earns, on
average, about 280,000 pesos at age twenty-five, or 2.3 times the earn-
ings of a high-school-educated individual. These differences increase
with age. At age fifty, a college-educated individual earns 2.5 times the
earnings of a person who finished high school and 3.8 times the earn-
ings of an individual who only completed eight years of schooling. These
differences widen further when we take into account the findings that
education and household size are negatively related and that household
size has a negative impact on earnings. Educated people are less likely
to be married than individuals with incomplete schooling, but this cor-
relation is quite small in the sample.
3.1 The Dynamics of Income
Since we do not follow the same individuals over time, we esti-
mate the income process using a synthetic panel approach. For each
individual in the sample, we take the unexplained component of the
log of income as
We then classify all observations according to birth cohort to form our
synthetic panel. Figure 5 tracks the variance of the unexplained por-
tion of earnings within each cohort observed from 1990 through 2000.
The variance clearly increases with age, which reflects the fact that
individuals who are identical ex ante may follow quite different paths
of income. In other words, in a sample of ex ante identical
Figure 4. Mean Monthly Labor Income
ˆ ˆ . y η= − β Z
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 395
agents, income inequality increases over time whenever there is a perma-
nent component in uncertainty. If all shocks were i.i.d., the distribution of
income would be age independent. Furthermore, individuals actually start
off at very different levels, as the initial variance is quite high.
The figure does not show important differences across cohorts.
Except for the younger cohorts, the time path of the variance of earn-
ings for any two consecutive cohorts typically cross, with no clear
pattern. This means that individuals born in different years should
not expect different levels of uncertainty at a given age. For all co-
horts, the variance tends to peak around 1996, indicating the pres-
ence of time effects in the cross-sectional variance of income—perhaps
aggregate fluctuations that change the dispersion of income.
Table 4 displays the sample autocovariance matrix of the residual
of log income changes. The upper right triangle shows the covari-
ances; the lower left triangle shows the correlations. We find high
autocorrelations at the first order, followed by a steep decline at higher
orders. These patterns suggest that income changes may be modeled
as an MA(1) process.
Our benchmark estimates are reported in table 5, where we define
income as annual individual earnings (without government transfers).
Three cases are analyzed depending on whether the permanent com-
ponent follows a random walk or an AR(1) stationary process and
whether the transitory shock is i.i.d. or an MA(1) process. In all cases,
the transitory component is not significant at the 5 percent level. The
transitory shock does not show any persistence, either. These findings
are consistent with the hypothesis that the transitory component is
i.i.d at the individual level and that this component becomes negligible
Figure 5. Residual Variance across Cohorts: ESI, 1990–2000a
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
a. The nine cohorts are defined by their age in 1990; from left to right, they are sixteen to twenty years of age;
twenty-one to twenty-five years of age; twenty-six to thirty years of age; thirty-one to thirty-five years of age;
thirty-six to forty years of age; forty-one to forty-five years of age; forty-six to fifty years of age; fifty-one to fifty-
five years of age; and fifty-six to sixty years of age.396 Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea Repetto
when we average within cohorts. In other words, the transitory compo-
nent is indistinguishable from classical measurement error. The per-
manent component follows an AR(1) process, as the autocorrelation
coefficient is statistically smaller than 1. The estimated variance of
the permanent component is much larger than the variance of the
transitory shock, but it is an order of magnitude smaller than the
variance estimated by several authors using a panel of individual U.S.
data from panel sets such as the PSID.10 This large difference can
also be explained by the fact that we track cohorts and not individu-
als over time.11 We further investigate this hypothesis below.
Table 5 also estimates the dynamics of Chilean earnings using la-
bor income plus government transfers. This exercise identifies the ex-
tent to which the government provides insurance through its monetary
Table 4. Covariance Matrix of Log Income Changes: ESIa
10. See Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for the most recent results.
11. See Pischke (1995) for a comparison of the variability and persistence of
aggregate and individual income.









Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
a. Correlations are below the diagonal; covariances are above the diagonal. Statistical significance is in parentheses.
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transfers. A number of papers analyze the role of government transfers
in alleviating poverty and reducing income inequality in Chile
(Baytelman, Cowan, and De Gregorio, 1999; Engel, Galetovic, and
Raddatz, 1999). We analyze whether public transfers reduce the un-
certainty faced by individuals.
The estimated income processes with and without transfers are
very much alike. This is due to the fact that very few individuals
report having received transfers in our data set.12 However, a probit
regression of a dummy indicating whether the individual received a
positive transfer on the level of real earnings, as well as year, month,
and regional dummies, yields a highly significant negative effect of
Definition of income Permanent component Transitory component















Table 5. The Dynamic Process of Labor Income: ESIa
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. Income is defined as annual individual earnings, with and without government transfers. The assumed
income processes vary depending on whether the permanent component follows a random walk or an AR(1)
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12. Only about 1.5 percent report a positive level of transfers. This underreporting
of transfers might be explained by the fact that most monetary subsidies are paid
through the worker’s paycheck, which may lead individuals to incorrectly report
transfers as part of their labor earnings.398 Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea Repetto
perceived income on the probability of receiving a transfer. Hence, pub-
lic transfers do play a limited redistributive role in our sample.13
We have thus far restricted the variances of the shocks to be
constant over time, although our modeling structure allows for time-
varying variances. Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we can
identify the evolution of the variance of the permanent shock using
the following moment condition:
where c indexes cohorts, t indexes years, and q is the order of the MA
(transitory) component. Figure 6 plots the estimated evolution of the
variance of the permanent component, along with the unemployment
rate. Unfortunately, our sample is short and was interrupted in 1994,
so we are only able to estimate the variance for 1992, 1997, 1998, and
1999. Except for 1999, the unemployment rate and permanent vari-
ance behave in a synchronized manner. Our point estimate of the 1999
variance is negative, but not statistically significant. Our results thus
show that income uncertainty correlates with the business cycle.
13. The marginal effect is –2.08  10–8, so each additional 200,000 pesos of
income (about one standard deviation in the sample) reduces the chance of receiv-
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Figure 6. Variance of Permanent Shock and Unemployment
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 399
3.2 Synthetic Cohorts and Variance Underestimation:
Comparing Chile and the United States
To further investigate the hypothesis that cohort averaging leads
to a large underestimation of the variances, we study whether our
estimation process leads to similar results when we use data from
the United States. Specifically, we compare our results to those ob-
tained from a comparable sample taken from U.S. data, using a syn-
thetic panel and individual-level data. Our source of information is
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a representa-
tive longitudinal survey of nearly 8,000 households. The PSID started
collecting data on individuals and households in 1968, and it has fol-
lowed the same households and their split-offs on a yearly basis since
then. The survey has rich data on a large number of economic and
demographic variables. Below we exploit the fact that the PSID has a
panel structure, which allows us to estimate the dynamics of income
using individual data directly. We then reestimate the process using
cohort data to analyze the way estimated parameters are affected by
using a synthetic panel technique. We use the surveys from 1988 to
1997. Table 6 reports some sample descriptive statistics.
Our analysis of the U.S. data replicates the analysis of Chilean
data. We first restrict our samples to men between the ages of twenty-
five and sixty. We deflate wage income by the consumer price index
for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and then estimate the predictable
component of labor income using the same variables and functional
form reported for Chile in the previous subsection. We construct a
series for the unexplained portion of labor income for every individual
in our sample. We use the sample weights to perform our estimates.
Standard
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Source: PSID survey data (SRC, 1988–97).
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Figure 7 plots the behavior of the U.S. within-cohort residual vari-
ance over the sample period. As in the Chilean case, the figures do not
reveal the presence of a cohort effect. Two properties are not shared by
the Chilean and U.S. profiles. First, the variance is quite flat over
most of the life-cycle in the United States, whereas it increases with
age in Chile. Second, the variance is much larger in the United States
than in Chile—almost 2.05 times larger on average. This result seems
counterintuitive, and it is not an artifact of the different currency de-
nominations used to measure income, as income is measured in logs.14
This striking gap in earnings risk may be the result of institutional
rigidities that reduce wage dispersion in the Chilean labor market rela-
tive to the U.S. labor market. As shown by Bertola and Ichino (1995),
wage inequality is reduced in markets where workers move across firms,
occupations, and regions in response to productivity and demand shocks.
Wage dispersion differences may thus reflect different labor market
institutions, labor reallocation costs, and wage contract structures.
Alternatively, once we allow for the endogeneity of earnings, a pos-
14. Survey methodologies and the extent of measurement error might partly
explain these differences. However, the U.S. variance of log real earnings is higher
than the Chilean variance even before conditioning on worker characteristics.
Furthermore, the R2 of the regression is much higher for the Chilean data than
for the U.S. data, so a larger portion of total income variability in Chile is explained
by the predictable part of earnings. Both facts are consistent with the notion that
Chilean workers face much less income uncertainty than do their American coun-
terparts. We obtained similar results using the 1990–2000 Current Population
Survey (CPS); these results are available on request.
Figure 7. Residual Variance across Cohorts: PSID, 1988–97a
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on PSID survey data (SRC, 1988–97).
a. The eight cohorts are defined by their age in 1988; from left to right, they are nineteen to twenty-four years of
age; twenty-five to twenty-nine years of age; thirty to thirty-four years of age; thirty-five to thirty-nine years of
age; forty to forty-four years of age; forty-five to forty-nine years of age; fifty to fifty-four years of age; and fifty-
five to sixty years of age.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 401
sible explanation is that U.S. workers are willing to face a much larger
level of uncertainty than their Chilean counterparts, as they have more
opportunities to share risks through the marketplace given their bet-
ter-developed markets. Furthermore, the public welfare system is much
larger in the United States than in Chile, and female labor force par-
ticipation is much higher. Both of these circumstances provide insur-
ance against negative shocks. Therefore, our results are consistent with
the hypothesis that workers in the United States can afford to take
more risks than workers in Chile, and they thus choose riskier occupa-
tions and jobs.
The gap between the variance in Chile and the United States is
reduced as individuals age. This fact might also have an institutional
explanation: minimum wage laws might have a larger effect on young
workers in Chile than in the United States. Indeed, the Chilean real
minimum wage rose 72 percent over the sample years, whereas the
U.S. real minimum wage rose only 18 percent.
In table 7 we estimate the dynamics of income using the informa-
tion on U.S. workers, assuming the process is described by a random
walk plus an i.i.d. transitory disturbance. For comparison, the table re-
peats the results obtained using the ESI and then presents the results
using synthetic cohorts from the PSID. As with the Chilean case, we find




Table 7. The Dynamic Process of Labor Income: Chile and the
United Statesa
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI and PSID survey data (INE, 1990–2000; SRC, 1988–97).
a. The simulations assume a random walk plus an i.i.d. transitory disturbance. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
     0.00303
    (0.00067)
     0.01181
    (0.00362)
     0.08150
    (0.00839)
     0.00030
    (0.00026)
     0.00080
    (0.00157)
     0.11173
    (0.00644)
that the process can be described solely by a random walk, as the transi-
tory shock averages out in the aggregate. Moreover, the variance of the
permanent shock is much larger in the United States than in Chile,402 Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea Repetto
which confirms the results in figures 5 and 7.15
Finally, table 7 reports the estimated parameters using individual-
level data from the PSID. We find that the variance of the permanent
shock is one order of magnitude larger than the variance estimated us-
ing cohort data. We also find a significant variance of the transitory shock.16
Our results are consistent with other analyses. For instance, Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004) use a similar sample from the PSID and find
that the variance of the permanent shock is 0.0313, whereas the vari-
ance of the transitory shock is between 0.008 and 0.03.17
If we extrapolate the information in the PSID exercises to the
Chilean case, the variance of the permanent shock is one order of
magnitude larger than the variance estimated using the panel of co-
horts, that is, about 0.0209. The variance of the transitory shock is
also likely to be different from zero. These results have important
behavioral implications. First, if innovations are permanent and indi-
viduals are prudent, then precautionary savings can become quanti-
tatively very important (Deaton, 1992). Second, the distribution of
labor income can be persistently very unequal. Finally, the position
of an individual on the income distribution is also highly persistent,
as good and bad fortunes last forever. Below we provide simulation
exercises to illustrate these points. We first simulate life-cycle paths
of income using our estimated processes. We then use the simulated
outcomes to build income distributions and estimate the likelihood
that an individual will move along the income distribution.
4. APPLICATION TO EARNINGS MOBILITY
Our application refers to income inequality and earnings persis-
tence over the life cycle. We provide two sets of exercises that illus-
trate the effects of shock variance and persistence, using our benchmark
estimates. The first set estimates transition matrices—the conditional
probability that an individual will move along the income distribu-
15. The qualitative results are similar if we assume either an AR(1) plus an
i.i.d. shock or a random walk plus an MA(1) shock.
16. Since we estimated the processes using a nonlinear methodology, we
should not expect to find that the cohort-level variance is equal to the individual-
level variance divided by the number of individuals in the cohort.
17. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) allow for measurement error and show that
the process for measurement error and for the transitory shock cannot be identi-
fied without external information. They find that the variance of the error in mea-
surement must be between 0.01 and 0.03, assuming an MA(1) transitory shock.
They estimate that the MA(1) coefficient is bounded between –0.18 and –0.25.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 403
tion—that results from the estimated persistence of the dynamics of
income. The second set of exercises estimates the distribution of in-
come that results from the estimated variances.
To compute the transition matrices and the income distributions,
we first generate 5,000 lifetime income streams based on our esti-
mates. We assume a life-cycle of thirty-five years (ages twenty-five
through sixty) and set the parameters of the model equal to the values
estimated in table 5. We assume all individuals are identical at age twenty-
five. Table 8 shows the simulated one-year transition matrices that re-
sult from assuming a random walk and an AR(1) process with first-order
autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.93095. The high persistence of the
shocks implies that earnings mobility is very limited. For instance, an
individual who starts off at the lowest quintile of the distribution has a
0.77–0.84 chance of staying there for another period. The likelihood of an
individual at the richest quintile staying at that same quintile is quite
similar. As expected, mobility is concentrated at the middle of the distri-
bution, but the persistence is still quite high. Table 9 shows the simu-
lated ten-year transition matrices (that is, the chance that an individual
starting off at any given quintile will be at the same or at another quintile
ten years ahead). Since the processes we estimate are highly persis-
tent, mobility is rather limited even over a ten-year horizon. Figures 8
and 9 show the chance that an individual at any given point in life will
be at the third and lowest quintiles, respectively, under the two alterna-
Income process and income Income quintile in t + 1

























Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).









































0.76Income process and income Income quintile in t + 10

























Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).










































Figure 8. Income Mobility and Lifetime Persistence: Third
Quintile
Figure 9. Income Mobility and Lifetime Persistence: Lowest
Quintile
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ESI survey data (INE, 1990–2000).The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 405
tive levels of persistence. A major implication of our results is that poverty
and the distribution of income in Chile should be quite persistent.
The variance level of the income process has important implica-
tions for the skewness of the income distribution. Table 10 shows the
share of total income of individuals at different positions of the in-
come distribution and at different ages. The first column reports the
simulation results using the estimated variance. The second column
uses the scaled ESI variance to account for the underestimation im-
plied by our cohort technique. For instance, the richest 20 percent of
individuals at age thirty receive a share of income that is 1.41 times
the share of the poorest 20 percent, assuming our uncorrected bench-
mark estimates. This ratio increases to 2.48 when we scale the vari-
ance according to our PSID results. Because of the persistence of our
estimates, simulated inequality increases with age. Nevertheless, our
simulations cannot match actual income disparities. According to the
CASEN, the richest quintile receives a share of about 13.8 times the
share of the lowest quintile. Our underestimation is the result of the
Age of Income shares Share V /Share I






Table 10. Simulated Income Distributions
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assumption that all individuals start off with the same characteristics.
In particular, we assume the same educational attainment across work-
ers. As discussed earlier, figure 4 shows that schooling might explain a
large portion of income inequality. Still, once we take the scaled vari-
ances, a large portion of actual inequality is explained by the underly-
ing variability of the process of individual income.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have estimated the dynamic process of individual
income using the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos. We found the
income process to be characterized by high persistence but low vari-
ability. We also showed that the low variance is an artifact of our co-
hort technique. Using data for U.S. workers, we found that averaging
over cohorts leads to variance underestimation of one order of magni-
tude. Future work should directly address the issue of underestima-
tion, which requires long panel sets of data on individual income. Different
organizations in Chile have collected rich panel data sets that follow
workers over long periods of time and on a monthly basis. Unfortunately,
these data sets currently are not publicly available.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 407
APPENDIX
Estimating Dynamics Using the CASEN Data
Most of the existing analyses of Chilean household income are
based on data from the CASEN survey. Unfortunately, the CASEN
only gathers information every other year. Based on the ESI, our
results show that the dynamics of earnings is highly persistent. The
CASEN thus misses most of the action in the two-year lag. We for-
mally show in this appendix that it is not possible to estimate our
income processes using this survey.
Our benchmark model assumes that the stochastic component of
income can be decomposed into permanent and transitory shocks:
If the permanent shock follows a random walk and the transitory
shock follows an MA(1) process, then
We identify the model’s parameters using GMM by matching popu-
lation and sample moments. To use the CASEN, we would then need
to match the covariances of second differences; that is,
The relevant population moments are thus as follows:
                          , for j ≥
Assume that variances are time independent. The identification
conditions then reduce to
.
p
it it it it y η= + µ +ω
1 and
pp
it it it yy − =+ υ
1 . it it it− µ =ε −θ ε
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2 var 2 2 1 , it υε ∆η = σ + + θ σ
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This model does not have a unique solution: only the first two
equations provide useful information, but there are three unknown
parameters to solve for. Thus, the CASEN does not have enough
information to estimate the underlying parameters of our model.
() ()
2
22 2 cov , 1 , and it it−ε ∆η ∆η =− + θ σ
() 22 cov , 0 it it j − ∆η ∆η = , or j ≥ 4.The Dynamics of Earnings in Chile 409
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